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(WHEN) CAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM JUSTIFY
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION?—A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

Noa Mendelsohn Aviv*
INTRODUCTION
Is it justifiable to ban LGBTQ-positive resources from a
public school classroom because of the religious views of some
parents?1 Should bed and breakfast owners be permitted, on the
basis of their religious beliefs, to cancel the room reservation of a
gay couple?2 What about a printer whose religious beliefs are in
conflict with the material he’s being asked to produce for the Gay
and Lesbian Archives?3 And how should we respond to marriage
commissioners, acting on behalf of the province, who refuse to
perform same-sex marriages as to do so would violate their
religious beliefs?4 These are some of the questions that have faced
Canadian courts and human rights tribunals in the past number of
years.
The underlying question in these cases asks: in what
circumstances, if ever, will a service provider’s beliefs justify
exempting them from the duty to provide services without
* Noa Mendelsohn Aviv is Director of the Equality Program at the Canadian
Civil Liberties Association (CCLA). The author thanks Cara Zwibel and
Richard Moon for their time and insights. The opinions expressed in this paper
are those of the author.
1
See Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36 (2002), 4 S.C.R. 710
(Can.).
2
See Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast, 2012 BCHRT 247 (Can.).
3
See Ontario Human Rights Comm’n v. Brockie (2002), 161 O.A.C. 324
(Can. On. Sup. Ct. J.).
4
See In re Marriage Comm’rs Appointed under the Marriage Act, 2011
SCKA 3 (Can.).
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity? The conflict in these “belief-based exemption cases,” as
they will be referred to in this Article, arises in the clash between
two fundamental and constitutionally protected rights, freedom of
religion and equality—a clash that does not readily lend itself to
reconciliation.
Conflicts between fundamental rights are never easy, in
particular when they elicit highly emotive topics that touch on
deeply held fundamental beliefs. And in Canadian law, there is a
well-established principle that when it comes to the fundamental
rights and freedoms protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (the “Charter”),5 there is no hierarchy: rather than
staking out a “trump” right that will always prevail, the courts
are required to judge each case in its specific context.6 This has
not been an easy task for the adjudicative bodies charged with
deciding the belief-based exemption cases.
This Article provides a critical analysis of four belief-based
exemption decisions in Canada and considers what lessons (and
cautionary tales) can be learned from them to help resolve future
such cases. These lessons include the following: the issues are
complex, and as such, cannot be resolved in the abstract. Such
cases must be resolved in context on a case-by-case basis in
consideration of the evidence before the adjudicating body. A
Canadian Charter section 1 analysis may be particularly helpful in
this analysis. Solutions will likely be difficult, and one
fundamental right or the other may be violated. In addition,
adjudicators should take heed of their own prejudices and avoid
perpetuating in the courtroom the kind of discrimination at play in
society. Likewise, courts should be aware of their own biases and
recognize the genuine issues and rights at stake on both sides of
the conflict. Both equality and freedom of religion are
fundamental rights in Canada. For many individuals and groups,
their religious convictions underlie a strong belief in the inherent
dignity, worth, and equality of all people. For others, their
5

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
6
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (Can.) (citing Dagenais
v. Canadian Broad. Corp. (1994), 120 D.L.R. 4th 12 (Can. S.S.C.)).
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religion includes beliefs about proper conduct and practice and
how to interact with those who do not conform to these standards.
This may take the form of denying service to LGBTQ
individuals, for example, by denying them services. A secular
legal system must continue to recognize the sincerity of religious
beliefs, even if many in our society take issue with the content of
these beliefs. On the other side, discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity is a current as well as a
historic reality, and strong equality protections are critically
needed. Therefore, another principle that emerges from the case
law is the danger of creating sweeping exemptions or ex ante
policies that allow, legitimize, and perpetuate such
discrimination. Finally, in light of the breadth of potential
exemptions and the impact they would have, exemptions that
allow service providers to discriminate against LGBTQ people, if
allowed at all, should be strictly exceptional.
Given that analyses of belief-based exemptions must be made
in context, the scope of this Article will be limited to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the provision
of services. In addition, given the case law, the analysis will
focus on exemptions grounded in religious beliefs, as opposed to
beliefs based on personal convictions and conscience.
Part I provides a brief overview of statutory and constitutional
protections for equality and religious freedom in Canadian law.
Part II discusses four belief-based exemption cases from Canada,
offering a critical analysis of the central issues, while also
drawing out useful discussions and conclusions, and pointing out
dangers to be avoided in future cases of this nature. Part III
summarizes some of the central principles discussed, that may
prove helpful in considering belief-based exemptions.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: PROTECTION
AND EQUALITY IN CANADIAN LAW

OF

FREEDOM

OF

RELIGION

Both the right to freedom of religion and the right to equality
are constitutionally protected in Canada, as both are guaranteed in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter sets
out the fundamental rights and freedoms protected under the
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Canadian Constitution (of which the Charter is a part).
Section 1 of the Charter simultaneously guarantees Charter
rights whilst also providing for reasonable limits on those rights
in limited circumstances, as follows: “The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”7
This reasonable limits clause allows legislation and government
action to limit Charter rights, but only if the limit is for a
pressing and substantial objective, the means chosen by the law
or action are rationally connected to this objective, the limit is
minimally impairing, and the limit is proportional in that its
deleterious effects do not outweigh its salutary ones.8 Whether or
not a limit is reasonable must be judged in its context.9
As to the substantive rights at issue in the belief-based
exemption cases: Section 2 of the Charter establishes the right to
freedom of religion and conscience (among others) as follows:
(2) Everyone has the following fundamental
freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b)freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression, including freedom of the press and
other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.10
Section 15 of the Charter sets out the equality guarantee.
Section 15(1) provides: “Every individual is equal before and
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
7

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.).
8
See, e.g., Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2009 SCC
37, para. 186 (Can.).
9
See, e.g., Toronto Star Newspapers v. R., 2010 SCC 21, para. 3
(Can.).
10
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2 (U.K.).
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colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”11
While the Charter protects a full array of fundamental
rights—such as the rights to life and liberty, freedom of
expression, and freedom of association—across Canada, there are
also quasi-constitutional provincial, territorial, and federal
“human rights” statutes whose focus is the prohibition against
discrimination in such areas as housing, employment—and
significantly for this Article—the provision of services. In other
words, and to avoid semantic confusion, “human rights” in many
Canadian jurisdictions is sometimes understood in its legal
meaning as the specific right to be free from discrimination. And
human rights tribunals are for the most part established pursuant
to the aforementioned human rights statutes (not the Charter) to
adjudicate complaints of discrimination under these statutes.
Thus, belief-based exemption cases may be decided under the
Charter and resolved through a reasonable limits test under
section 1, or they may be decided under the human rights laws.
II. CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE—FOUR BELIEF-BASED EXEMPTION
CASES AND WHAT THEY CAN TEACH US

A. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Brockie:12 Can a
Commercial Printer Refuse a Printing Job On the Basis
That Its LGBTQ-Positive Content Violates His Belief?
In April 1996, Mr. Ray Brillinger went into a commercial
print shop on behalf of the Canadian Gay and Lesbian Archives
(“Archives”) and asked the printer to print blank letterhead and
envelopes for the Archives, as well as some business cards for its
officers.13 The text on the materials noted that the Archives
“represented [the] interests of ‘gays’ and ‘lesbians’ but said
nothing of [its] objects, activities or membership.”14 Without
inquiring into these matters, Mr. Brockie, the president of the
11

Id. § 15(1).

12

(2002) 161 O.A.C. 324 (Can. On. Sup. Ct. J.).
Id. at para. 6.

13
14

Id.
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print shop (the printer), would not provide this service and later
attempted to justify his refusal on the basis of the Charter right to
freedom of religion.
The evidence before the Ontario Human Rights Board (the
“Board”) included Mr. Brockie’s testimony as to his religious
beliefs, including a belief that “homosexuality is detestable” and
that “providing printing services to [LGBTQ] organizations
would be in direct opposition to his belief.”15 The printer had
previously done work for LGBTQ customers and for a company
which “produces underwear marketed to the gay male
population,” but argued that this was different since, in his view,
the Archives were promoting the “homosexual lifestyle.”16 The
Board decided against Mr. Brockie on the basis of the significant
social and historical discrimination faced by LGBTQ individuals,
the economic and psychological impact of this discrimination, and
the fact that Canadian society had decided to protect LGBTQ
people from discrimination. The Board found that Mr. Brockie
would still be free to hold and practice his beliefs within his home
and Christian community, just not by denying service to one
group in the public marketplace. In the result, the Board made
two orders against the printer. It ordered him and his company to
pay damages to Mr. Brillinger and the Archives. And it ordered
the printer in the future to provide printing services to LGBTQ
people and to organizations that exist for their benefit.17
On appeal, the printer claimed that this decision by the Board
violated his right to freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the
Charter and under section 15 as a violation of his right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of religion.18 He argued that his
dignity would be demeaned by being “conscripted to support a
cause with which he disagree[d]” on the basis of a sincere
religious belief.19 This, in his view, should confer a “defence to
discrimination” and a “right of dissent.”20
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at para. 15.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at para. 17.
Id. at para. 37.
Id. at para. 19.
Id.
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The court hearing the appeal presented this case as a “conflict
of dignities,”21 citing from the preamble to the Ontario Human
Rights Code22 (the “Code”), a statute dedicated to promoting
equality and prohibiting discrimination, as follows:
(a) recognition of the inherent dignity and the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world and is in accord
with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as proclaimed by the United Nations;
and
(b) it is public policy in Ontario to recognize the
dignity and work [worth] of every person and
to provide for equal rights and opportunities
without discrimination that is contrary to law,
and having as its aim the creation of a climate
of understanding and mutual respect for the
dignity and worth of each person so that each
person feels a part of the community and able
to contribute fully to the development and well
being of the community and the Province.23
The interesting question raised in this case asked: should there
be an exemption for a service provider who did not refuse to
serve LGBTQ individuals, but rather refused to produce content
that ran directly counter to the service provider’s own beliefs?
The court on appeal answered in the affirmative, while still
finding against Mr. Brockie with respect to the particular facts at
issue. The court upheld the Board’s specific order against the
printer requiring him to pay damages for refusing to print the
requested letterhead, envelopes and business cards. However, the
court modified the Board’s general order that would have
required him and his company to serve LGBTQ people and
LGBTQ-positive organizations in the future. Instead, the court
held that in the future, the printer would not be required “to print
21

Id. at para. 20.

22

Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, pmbl (Can.).

23

Id.
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material of a nature which could reasonably be considered to be
in direct conflict with the core elements of his religious beliefs or
creed.”24 Unfortunately, the court’s formulation is unworkable,
and it opens the door to many forms of unacceptable
discrimination.

The Issues: Who is a Person, Producing Content that Conflicts
with One’s Beliefs, and the Slippery Slope of Exemptions
As a preliminary matter, the court briefly considered the
question of who is a “person” under the Code—for the purpose of
bringing a discrimination claim, being the subject of a claim, or
raising the right to religious freedom—and whether these would
include organizations and corporations.25 The court found that the
term “person” could include a corporation responsible for
discriminating.26 Likewise, organizations and corporations were
able to claim that they are the object of discrimination, as this is
consistent with the Code’s purpose, and would allow those
suffering from discrimination to act in association with others.27
However, when it comes to the discriminator, the Court found
that a corporate entity could not assert a Charter right, such as
the right to freedom of religion.28 This finding may be helpful in
other exemption-based belief cases. It was, however, of no
practical import in Brockie, as Mr. Brockie was able to raise his
own individual Charter rights.
As to the main issue concerning the content of the requested
service, Mr. Brockie argued that there should be a distinction
between a refusal to provide service because of the customer’s
human characteristic, here his sexual orientation, and a refusal
aimed at a person engaged in the political act of promoting the
cause of those with such characteristics. The court rejected this
argument as specious and irrational.29 The court stated that no
24
25
26
27
28
29

Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324 at paras. 58–59.
Id. at para. 24.
Id.
Id. at para. 26.
Id. at para. 39.
Id. at para. 29.
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authorities had been cited to support such a distinction, and
concluded that “efforts to promote an understanding and respect
for those possessing any specified characteristic should not be
regarded as separate from the characteristic itself.”30 This
conclusion is similar to the Canadian courts’ consistent rejection
of attempts to distinguish between the identity and behaviour of
LGBTQ people31 (as discussed below) but goes even further. The
Court held that not only are individuals protected from
discrimination in relation to who they are and what they do, but
they are also protected in their endeavour to seek understanding
and respect for themselves.
The court then considered whether the Board, in making its
order against the printer, had exercised its discretion in a manner
consistent with the Charter.32 This order had not only required
Mr. Brockie to pay damages to Mr. Brillinger and the Archives,
but had also required that in the future, the printer would have to
provide printing services to LGBTQ people and to organizations
promoting their interests. All of the parties (and two of the
intervenors) conceded that the Board’s decision infringed Mr.
Brockie’s freedom of religion as it would force him to act in a
manner contrary to his beliefs.33 The question at issue was,
therefore, whether this infringement was justified under section 1
of the Charter.34
In its section 1 analysis, the court considered whether the
Board’s order was rationally connected to its objective.35 The
court distinguished between the activity in issue—the printing of
materials such as letterhead and business cards—and a
hypothetical situation involving the printing of materials with
more editorial content.36 The latter materials, in the court’s view,
30

Id. at para. 31.

31

Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, 2013 SCC 11, para.
123 (Can.) (citing Trinity W. Univ. v. Coll. of Teachers (1998), 169 D.L.R.
4th 234, para. 69 (Can. B.C. C.A.)).
32
Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324 at para. 36.
33
Id. at para. 40.
34
See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
35
Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324 at paras. 45–56.
36

Id.
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could espouse “causes or activities clearly repugnant to the
religious tenets of the printer.” Since the objective of the Code is
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics,
and to encourage equality, the court held that an order prohibiting
more than discrimination may not be rationally connected to its
objective, and even if so, would be unconstitutional.37
With respect to the minimal impairment branch of the section
1 analysis, the court found that: “[s]ervice of the public in a
commercial service must be considered at the periphery of
activities protected by freedom of religion,” and that limits to this
freedom may be justified where the exercise of this freedom
causes harm to others. Nonetheless, the court held that the
general order was not minimally impairing, as the Board could
have achieved its goals without intruding to the extent it did on
Mr. Brockie’s freedom.38
Finally, the court upheld the damages order against Mr.
Brockie for his refusal to print the letterhead, business cards and
envelopes at issue. However, the court modified the Board’s
general order concerning future print jobs, creating a new
standard and order according to which, the printer and shop
would not be required “to print material of a nature which could
reasonably be considered to be in direct conflict with the core
elements of his religious beliefs or creed.”39 The court offered
two contrasting examples to illustrate how, in its view, this would
work: (1) if the printing project contained material that
proselytized and promoted the “gay and lesbian lifestyle” or that
mocked Mr. Brockie’s religious beliefs, this material may be
found “in direct conflict with the core elements of his religious
beliefs;”40 and (2) if the material to be printed contained a
directory of goods and services of interest to the LGBTQ
community, this material may be held as not “in direct conflict
with the core elements of Mr. Brockie’s religious beliefs.”41

37
38
39
40
41

Id. at para. 49.
Id. at paras. 51–52.
Id. at para. 58.
Id. at para. 56.
Id.
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Presumably, then, the Court viewed the letterhead, envelopes and
business cards as falling into the second category.
The court in Brockie faced a difficult issue—how to uphold
the duty to provide services without discrimination, while also
recognizing the position of a service provider whose beliefs run
counter to the material they are being asked to produce. This
conundrum could also, in some respects, be stated in reverse
(although the Court did not do so): what if it had been Mr.
Brockie who had walked into the print shop of Mr. Brillinger,
asking on behalf of Mr. Brockie’s Church to print a brochure
containing anti-LGBTQ Biblical passages and a call-out to
LGBTQ people to attend this Church?42 Does the right to equality
in the public domain always require a service provider to produce
material regardless of its content? The court’s response attempted
to create an objective standard according to which the duty to
provide services to the public without discrimination would
generally be upheld, while exempting the printer if the material to
be printed was in direct conflict with the core elements of his
religious beliefs or creed. This standard is problematic on a
number of levels.
First, the idea of an objective standard to assess belief
systems is unfeasible. In Brockie, the court’s conclusion—and the
“objective standard” it relied upon—was that the printing of the
letterhead, business cards and envelopes was not in conflict with
Mr. Brockie’s core beliefs.43 This was based on a legal fiction.
Not only was no evidence produced to support this conclusion,
but it appeared to contradict the facts that were established in the
case. The court cited evidence showing that Mr. Brockie had
been willing to do business with LGBTQ people, as well as with
42

If the discrimination had been against a church, the analysis would be
different. As discussed supra Part I, an analysis concerning discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation must be viewed in light of its current and
historical contexts. Discrimination on the basis of religion and creed will raise
its own issues, for example: whether creed includes nonreligious beliefs based
on a person’s conscience; and whether disapproval of certain religious views
or practices ought to be considered discrimination. These issues are beyond the
scope of this Article.
43
See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
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a company whose underwear was marketed towards gay men.
Mr. Brockie’s refusal to do business with Mr. Brillinger, then,
appeared to have been based precisely on the content of the
materials. Given that Mr. Brockie chose to turn down business,
and potentially alienate Mr. Brillinger, the Gay and Lesbian
Archives, and possibly other customers as a result of his refusal,
it seems at least plausible, if not likely, that Mr. Brockie refused
to print the material because it was in direct conflict with his core
beliefs. The court’s “objective” standard is not helpful in
clarifying this situation.
Second, belief and practice are highly personal, a principle
well established by the Canadian courts.44 While Canadian courts
do utilize certain objective standards with respect to religious
beliefs—such as whether the infringement of these beliefs is
trivial or insubstantial45—it should be difficult for a court in some
circumstances to insert an “objective” standard without
supporting evidence to establish that a belief is not a core
element. This is especially true if a savvy service provider has
testified that avoiding the promotion of certain behaviours or
ideas is central to their religious and spiritual integrity.
Supporting evidence on whether or not a particular element or
belief is important to a person may come in many forms, such as
the individual’s testimony as to what impact would result from a
rights violation, and evidence concerning the consistency of their
behaviour, though these examples raise their own challenges.
Third, the court’s “objective” standard—that would exempt a
service provider from the duty to provide service without
discrimination if the product is in direct conflict with the core
elements of their religious beliefs—could also create a slippery
slope leading to countless additional denials of service. This point
was effectively made by the concurrence in Marriage
Commissioners.46 In the context of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, belief-based exemptions could be claimed by a

44

Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).
E.g., Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2009 SCC 37,
para. 32 (Can.) (citing Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R.).
46
See infra Part II.D for further discussion.
45
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wedding planner asked to organize a same-sex wedding, or
anyone associated with the wedding industry from the caterer to
the receptionist working for the dress-maker. An architect asked
to design a family home or bedroom could refuse, as could
anyone else in the building industry. An individual involved in
service or hospitality, such as a room service waiter or a
concierge asked for the location of a romantic restaurant might
feel the same urge to refuse. And the same may be said for any
person providing services to support the couple or family’s life as
a couple or family.
Indeed, the logic behind the court’s examples, suggesting that
Mr. Brockie may not refuse to print neutral, LGBTQ material,
but may refuse to print material that promotes the “gay and
lesbian lifestyle,”47 could justify many refusals as described in the
above paragraph, all of which involve the service provider
arguably promoting or contributing to said “lifestyle.” In
addition, the court’s attempted distinction between LGBTQ valueneutral content and LGBTQ promotional material bears a striking
resemblance to the distinction that the court had earlier rejected
between discrimination on the basis of sexual identity and
discrimination on the basis of sexual behaviour.48
A more useful standard may nonetheless be derived from one
of the examples provided by the court. The court had suggested
that it may be permissible to exempt Mr. Brockie if the brochure
mocked his religious beliefs.49 Given the danger of creating a
slippery slope and overly broad exemptions, this Article would
narrow the court’s example still further and consider permitting
an exemption for a service provider who refuses to produce
material that directly fosters hate towards the service provider
(and/or towards a group protected under the antidiscrimination
laws). Thus, if Mr. Brillinger had been the service provider and
had refused to print the above-mentioned hypothetical brochure
containing anti-LGBTQ Biblical passages, he might have been
justified in this refusal. Likewise, Mr. Brockie might be justified
47
48
49

See supra note 35–41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Brockie, 161 O.A.C. 324, at para. 31.

2014.05.05 AVIV.DOCX

5/11/2014 12:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

626

if he refused to print a brochure stating, for example, that any
church not recognizing LGBTQ rights is Satanic.
It should be noted that the issue of refusals on the basis of
content is limited in scope. Human rights laws prohibit only
discrimination on the basis of particular grounds (such as race,
gender, creed, and sexual orientation). In all other contexts, a
service provider is free to refuse to produce material that has a
message with which they disagree, as long as the message is not a
proxy for the protected group.
To conclude, the facts in Brockie present a useful basis for
considering discriminatory refusals involving content that violates
a service provider’s beliefs. While the Court’s attempt to define
an objective standard based on the core beliefs of the service
provider is not helpful, not feasible, and in fact demonstrates how
such standards could lead to a multitude of exemptions that would
undermine the purpose of the human rights laws, a narrowed
solution may exist for those situations in which a service provider
is asked to produce material that directly fosters hate towards the
service provider (and/or towards a group protected under the
antidiscrimination laws).

B. Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36:50 Can a
School Board Refuse to Allow into its Classrooms Books
Depicting Same-Sex Parents?
Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36 is one of the
most recent and relevant decisions from the Supreme Court of
Canada dealing with discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the provision of services, addressing both freedom
of religion and LGBTQ rights. Chamberlain involved a
kindergarten teacher who asked the local school board to approve
three books as supplementary learning resources for use in
teaching the family life education curriculum.51 The books—
Asha’s Mums, Belinda’s Bouquet, and One Dad, Two Dads,
Brown Dad, Blue Dads—depicted families with same-sex
50
51

4 S.C.R. 710 (2002) (Can.).
Id. at para. 44.
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parents.52 The school board responded by passing a resolution
refusing to allow these books into the schools.53 As a result of the
board’s resolution, in some schools in the district, certain
resources were removed, including library books, posters, and
pamphlets.54
While Chamberlain did not involve a private actor in the role
of service provider, it concerns discrimination in the provision of
“services.” Those being discriminated against or otherwise
negatively impacted may have included: children, parents,
teachers, and the general community. As to the service-provider,
while the discriminating body in this case was an elected school
board, its decision was based in large part on the views of
“parents” in the community who objected to the books, and a
concern that having the books at school would create controversy
in the children’s homes because of their parents’ views.
The majority rejected the school board’s resolution as
unreasonable for having violated the board’s obligations under its
governing statute and the relevant regulation, which should have
included secularism, nonsectarianism, tolerance, and respect for
diversity. By resolving the case on the basis of administrative law
principles in this manner, the majority declared it unnecessary to
address Charter issues.55 It was the dissent who raised the
difficult questions about the right to dissent and disapprove, and
who demonstrated the clash between freedom of religion and
equality and their underlying values in this case.56 A complete
analysis and response to the dissent should address these issues
through an expanded understanding of secularism and a
contextual balancing of the interests at stake, and then conclude,
as the majority did, that the school board’s decision to ban the
books was impermissible.

52
53
54
55
56

Id. at para. 50.
Id.
Id. at para. 46.
Id. at para. 76.
See id. at paras. 146–52.
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1. The Majority: Diversity, the Meaning of Secularism, and
Tolerance vs. Freedom of Religion
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice McLachlin,
decided against the school board on the basis of administrative
law, thus attempting to avoid the difficult issues by avoiding a
Charter analysis.57 However, the dissent tackled these issues
head-on, often in very problematic ways, as will be discussed.58
Perhaps in response to this, the majority relied on the relevant
administrative law to take strong stands on diversity, secularism,
and tolerance:59 It made a compelling case for respecting
diversity.60 It considered the meaning of secularism,61 whether
religious views may be included in public debate, and how these
views may and may not be used in decision-making.62 And the
majority responded to the dissent’s position on cognitive
dissonance—the experience of parents whose children may be
forced to learn values contradictory to those at home.63
On the issues of secularism and tolerance, the majority held
that these were part of the school board’s statutory obligations
which the board had failed to meet:
The Board’s first error was to violate the principles
of secularism and tolerance in [section] 76 of the
School Act. Instead of proceeding on the basis of
respect for all types of families, the Superintendent
and the Board proceeded on an exclusionary
philosophy. They acted on the concern of certain
parents about the morality of same-sex
57

The majority concluded that the school board’s decision must fail
because the board acted outside its statutory mandate by failing to apply both
statutory criteria and the board’s own procedures. Id. at para 59.
58
Id. at paras. 75–187 (Gonthier, J., dissenting); see also infra Part II.E.
59
Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 33 (majority opinion).
60
Id. at para. 49.
61
Id. at para. 33.
62
Id. at para. 59.
63
Id. at paras. 62–66. The majority also found that the school board had
failed to follow its regulation, and that the criteria it relied on were the wrong
ones. Id. at para. 71.
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relationships, without considering the interest of
same-sex parented families and children who
belong to them in receiving equal recognition and
respect in the school system.64
Similarly, the majority noted the requirement that the board
recognize diverse communities within the school district and
approach the needs of each with “respect and tolerance.”65 The
majority found that the board had not considered families with
same-sex parents and had relied instead on the views of a
particular group who opposed any depiction of same-sex
relationships.66
The recognition that there may be different kinds of families
in the school—some who oppose the book, some with same-sex
parents, some with an LGBTQ-positive approach—is so obvious
it should not need to be stated.67 But as will be discussed below,
this was a point the dissent missed almost entirely.68
The majority’s administrative law analysis also involved a
discussion about secularism and freedom of religion, and whether
the school board was permitted to take into account the views of
parents who objected to the books on the basis of religious
concerns. The majority concluded that the principle of secularism
required by the law did not preclude parents from objecting to the
books on the basis of religious considerations.69 What secularism
did require, they found, was that the religious views of one part
of the community could not be used to exclude minority voices,
that educational decisions and policies must respect the
“multiplicity of religious and moral views”70 held by parents and
families in the community, and that the board’s decision must be
reasonable in the context of the statutory scheme. In his
concurring opinion, Justice LeBel agreed with the majority’s
64
65
66

Id. at para. 58.
Id. at para. 25.
Id. at para 71.

67

There will also be families with LGBTQ children and members of the
community with a deeply held, fundamental belief in equality.
68
See discussion infra Part II.E.
69
Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 59.
70

Id.
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conclusion that parents’ decisions can be based on religious or
other views.71 However, for Justice LeBel¸ the idea of secularism
would rule out “policy based on beliefs that are intolerant of
others . . . whether those beliefs are religious, moral or
philosophical.”72 Translating such beliefs into policy is
prohibited, he continued, to the extent that these beliefs deny the
validity of other points of view:
There is no difficulty in reconciling the School
Act’s commitment to secularism with freedom of
religion. Freedom of religion is not diminished,
but is safeguarded, by the state’s abstention from
favouring or promoting any specific religious creed
. . . . Disagreement with the practices and beliefs
of others, while certainly permissible and perhaps
inevitable in a pluralist society, does not justify
denying others the opportunity for their views to
be represented, or refusing to acknowledge their
existence.73
Accordingly, the majority seemed to imply what the
concurrence stated explicitly—that the constitutional right to
freedom of religion, coupled with the board’s statutory duty to
uphold the principle of secularism, required that there be room
for all manner of belief and opinion. Given the inevitable
conflicts that may arise between two or more belief systems,
intolerance would not be tolerated. It would be interesting to
consider expanding the meaning of secularism still further, such
that in a situation involving a fundamental rights violation,
community standards (and prejudices) could not prevail over
evidence-based decision making.
Another interesting aspect of the majority opinion was its
response to the school board’s reliance on the concept of
“cognitive dissonance”74 in order to exclude the books. The board
had used this term to mean that children should not be exposed to
71
72
73
74

Id. at para. 188 (Lebel, J., concurring).
Id. at para. 210.
Id. at paras. 211–12.
Id. at para. 64 (majority opinion).
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ideas with which their parents disagreed.75 The majority found
this argument antithetical to the curriculum’s objective of
promoting tolerance and an understanding of all types of families.
The majority provided a number of examples of differences
(based on religion or morals) that may be found in a diverse
community—including differences in what classmates were
permitted to eat or wear or how they behaved—and stated:
[S]uch dissonance is neither avoidable nor noxious.
Children encounter it every day in the public
school system as members of a diverse student
body . . . . The cognitive dissonance that results
from such encounters is simply a part of living in a
diverse society. It is also a part of growing up.
Through such experiences, children come to
realize that not all of their values are shared by
others. Exposure to some cognitive dissonance is
arguably necessary if children are to be taught
what tolerance itself involves . . . . When we ask
people to be tolerant of others, we do not ask them
to abandon their personal convictions. We merely
ask them to respect the rights, values and ways of
being of those who may not share those
convictions. The belief that others are entitled to
equal respect depends, not on the belief that their
values are right, but on the belief that they have a
claim to equal respect regardless of whether they
are right. Learning about tolerance is therefore
learning that other people’s entitlement to respect
from us does not depend on whether their views
accord with our own. Children cannot learn this
unless they are exposed to views that differ from
those they are taught at home.76
The emphasis on tolerance is critical in a multicultural
society, and it is true that members of this society—children and
adults—will be exposed to diverse customs, families, and values.
75
76

Id. at para. 58.
Id. at paras. 65–66.
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However, the majority’s analysis would have been far better if it
had reached this conclusion without minimizing the genuine harm
that may have been suffered by some parents who objected to the
books and whose children may have been in the classrooms at
issue. Once images have been viewed, words read, or ideas
shared among the children, they cannot be unviewed and
unlearned. Many parents would recoil at the thought of their
children being coercively taught values that directly contravene
their own—whether such values espouse militarism, sexism, or a
particular telling of history. Indeed, as will be discussed, such
coercion may amount to a violation of the parents’ dignity. And
while the possibility of private school or home-schooling77 may
allow certain parents to opt out of the public system, such an
option is beyond the means of many families due to the cost of
private school and the financial needs of families with two
working parents. Leaving the public school system could also
result in a loss of other benefits, such as academic standards,
social and community engagement, and sports and art programs.
These benefits should, of course, also be available to LGBTQ
students, parents, teachers, and equality seekers. Therefore, on
balance, openness, inclusion, and diversity would need to prevail.
To conclude, while the majority reached the correct
conclusion, it would have been preferable if it had done so with
greater sensitivity to the religious freedom of the objecting
parents. Such sensitivity would have required the majority to
directly engage the real rights infringement faced by these parents
and the difficult issues presented by the dissent. The resulting
discussion would have more accurately depicted the interests at
stake, and would have been richer as a result.

2. The Dissent: Heterosexist Assumptions, Sincere
Discriminatory Beliefs, and Dignity
The dissenting opinion, delivered by Justice Gonthier, was
indeed sensitive to the harms suffered by objecting parents. As
such, the dissent raised the difficult issues in this case concerning
77

Id. at para. 30.

2014.05.05 AVIV.DOCX

5/11/2014 12:35 PM

(WHEN) CAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM JUSTIFY

633

freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, equality, and
freedom of expression; the tension when a dissenting opinion is
discriminatory; and the collision of dignities between those of
differing views.78 In other respects, however, the dissenting
opinion should serve as a cautionary tale of how not to adjudicate
cases involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
With respect, significant parts of this opinion were based on
anachronistic ideas and a heteronormative perspective that quite
simply failed to recognize the claims and, in some cases, the
existence of LGBTQ children, parents, and educators, as well as
other equality seekers in the community.
First, the dissent relied on the distinction (already then
discredited in the case law) between the right to equality of all
persons, which it said was “consonant with their inherent human
dignity,” and the “conduct of persons,” which it implied may not
be deserving of equal respect, concern, and consideration.79 The
sexual orientation/sexual behaviour distinction (alternatively
referred to as the status/conduct or identity/practice distinction) is
one that recurs throughout the belief-based exemption cases.
Canadian tribunals and courts have consistently rejected this
distinction when it comes to LGBTQ rights, affirming instead
that: “Human rights law states that certain practices cannot be
separated from identity, such that condemnation of the practice is
a condemnation of the person.”80
Second, the dissenting opinion attempted to distinguish
between the rights of “homosexual persons” to be free from
discrimination and “parental rights to make the decisions they
deem necessary to ensure the well-being and moral education of
their children.”81 In other words, the dissent’s analysis proceeded
as if there were two distinct categories: (1) parents who have a
right to educate their children, raise them in their faith, and

78
79
80

Id. at paras. 75–187 (Gonthier, J., dissenting).
Id. at para. 77.

Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, 2013 SCC 11,
para. 123 (Can.) (citing Trinity W. Univ. v. Coll. of Teachers (1998), 169
D.L.R. 4th 234, para. 69 (Can. B.C. C.A.)).
81
Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710, at para. 79 (Gonthier J., dissenting).
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decide their “best interests;”82 and (2) “homosexual persons”
seeking the inclusion of LGBTQ-positive materials in schools.83
The values and rights of LGBTQ or LGBTQ-positive parents or
students were largely excluded from the analysis and did not
seem to play a significant role in the dissenting opinion’s heteronormative worldview.84
Third, unfortunately and with respect, things went from bad
to worse when the dissent tried to determine whether the books
under discussion were about nondiscrimination, or whether they
contained LGBTQ-positive messaging.85 The low point in a lessthan-flawless opinion occurred when the dissenting judges, two
members of the Supreme Court of Canada, expressed this
distinction with no apparent shame or apology as follows:
The experts basically present two competing views
of these Three Books. One view is that they are
simply books aimed at the dominant theme of
nondiscrimination, with the presence of parents in
a same-sex relationship simply being tangential
context. The books are therefore about acceptance.
The other view is that regardless of the valid and
present acceptance theme, a different message is
also present: parents in same-sex relationships are

being portrayed as “normal” by being portrayed in
a positive sense.86

There is good reason to take issue with the above aspects of
the dissenting opinion. Nonetheless, the dissent should be
credited with bringing to the surface one of the fundamental
82
83
84

Id. at para. 103.
Id. at para. 125.

There are a few small references in the dissent to the possibility that
LGBTQ people might have children; however, these are only raised, it seems,
as theoretical constructs, which seem to have no connection with the “parents”
who appear far more frequently throughout the opinion, and who feature in the
dissent’s reasoning as those who have a right to decide what is best for their
children. Id. at paras. 120, 147.
85
This, in itself, is a questionable distinction.
86
Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 174 (Gonthier, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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challenges in this case: in a liberal, pluralistic society, how
should the right to equality interact with dissenting beliefs. The
dissent expressed this challenge as follows:
It is a feeble notion of pluralism that transforms
“tolerance” into “mandated approval or
acceptance.” In my view, the inherent dignity of
the individual not only survives such moral
disapproval, but to insist on the alternative risks
treating another person in a manner inconsistent
with their human dignity: there is a potential for a
collision of dignities. Surely a person’s [section]
2(a) or [section] 2(b) Charter right to hold beliefs
which disapprove of the conduct of others cannot
be obliterated by another person’s [section] 15
rights, just like a person’s [section] 15 rights
cannot be trumped by [section] 2(a) or 2(b) rights.
In such cases, there is a need for reasonable
accommodation or balancing.87
There are a number of interesting threads in this reasoning.
First, there is the assertion that people can and must be able to
hold a diversity of views to agree with, but also to disapprove of
each other’s conduct. For this reason, the dissent asserted,
equality cannot simply trump freedom of religion and
conscience—there will be a need for balancing.88 Second, it is not
clear if the dissenting judges required that only beliefs based on
religion must be protected. For the dissenting judges, it may have
been that one person disapproving of another’s conduct
constituted a protected belief. They did not explicitly require that
such beliefs be religiously grounded. The third thread is the idea
that dignity may in some cases be offended when one’s freedom
of religion is violated.
While the reasoning in these threads is correct, they fail to
paint a full picture, and deserve further attention. With respect to
the first thread, protections for dissenting and pluralistic views
are critical. It is true that such views may protect offensive
87
88

Id. at para. 132.
Id. at paras. 132–35.
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beliefs such as those of the objecting parents, but they have also
protected minority and marginalized views—including LGBTQpositive positions. However, what was missing from the dissent’s
analysis was the deeply inequitable context in which these two
dissenting views were competing. At the time of the Chamberlain
challenge, majoritarian privilege rested with the community that
banned the books and accepted anti-LGBTQ discrimination. In
addition, in the conflict between the two dissenting views, one
(the anti-LGBTQ perspective) was aimed at singling out,
excluding, and removing from the classroom any resources that
mentioned the other (LGBTQ parents).
With regard to the second thread concerning the basis of the
beliefs, it is important that deeply held fundamental beliefs of
conscience be respected and protected. In the Canadian
Constitution, freedom of conscience is protected under the
Charter alongside freedom of religion.89 Such freedom of
conscience may protect a person’s right to hold anti-LGBTQ
beliefs even if not based on a religious worldview, though the
content of such beliefs may lose validity or credibility in the
public perception, absent a religious connection. Indeed,
discriminatory acts and beliefs that lack the sanction of a religious
worldview may better demonstrate the intolerable nature of such
discrimination. However, freedom of conscience should also
protect a person’s right to the belief that all people are born equal
in dignity and rights. This belief can and frequently is grounded
in religious roots. It could also be based on secular humanism or
other deeply held convictions. The practical result, with respect
to the belief-based exemption cases, is that if a person
experiences discrimination on the basis of their sexual
orientation, it is not just their equality rights that have been
violated. There may well also have been a violation of their and
others’ deeply held fundamental belief in equality and dignity. In
Chamberlain, for example, parents with deeply held beliefs in the
equality of all people may have felt that the school board’s ban

89

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2(a) (U.K.).
See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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violated their freedom of conscience or religion and caused
cognitive dissonance in their homes. The same may be said of
Mr. Brillinger when he was denied printing services, or any
person for whom equality is a fundamental value, when forced to
participate in a discriminatory situation, whether the
discrimination is against themselves or others. For this reason,
invoking freedom of religion and conscience may not be
determinative in resolving such cases.
Finally, on the issue of dignity, the dissent provided an
important reminder that a violation of religious freedom could
offend one’s dignity.90 “Dignity” is most commonly associated
with equality rights, and discrimination will in many cases result
in injury to a person’s dignity. What the dissent establishes is that
dignity is not just the purview of equality. If, for example, one is
coerced to act against one’s deeply held fundamental beliefs, such
as being forced to convert to another religion, or perhaps to
violate one’s laws of purity, or as here, to have one’s children
taught to believe in a value that contradicts one’s own beliefs,
such coercion could amount to a violation of dignity. In the
result, resort to the notion of “dignity” could apply to equality or
freedom of religion, and as such, this concept may also not be
determinative in resolving tensions between these rights in the
belief-based exemption cases. A “collision of dignities,” as
mentioned in the dissent, may require another form of
resolution.91
In conclusion, the court may have done well to rely on an
expanded understanding of secularism. Given a situation in which
fundamental rights were at stake, the decision about allowing
resources into the classroom should perhaps have been based on
evidence as to the material’s educational value, ability to engage,
age appropriateness, or harmfulness. A proportionality analysis
should require that parents’ objections on the basis of their
religious freedom would need to be weighed in context against
the impact on LGBTQ parents, children, teachers, and others that
would be singled out for exclusion, and the fact that all children
90
91

Chamberlain, 4 S.C.R. 710 at para. 134 (Gonthier, J., dissenting).
Id. at para. 132.
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in the relevant grades would be deprived of exposure to the
diversity at issue. While the dissent raised compelling questions
about a collision of dignities and the right to disapprove and
dissent, on balance in this case, the objecting parents seeking to
single out a group for discrimination and exclusion in a public
school should not be able to rely on rights such as freedom of
religion and equality, whose very purpose is to avoid
discrimination and exclusion.

C. Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast:92 Can Bed and
Breakfast Owners Rely on Their Religious Convictions to
Deny a Room to a Gay Couple?
The case of Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast involved a
couple (the “complainants”) who booked a room at the Riverbend
Bed and Breakfast (the “Riverbend”).93 When the Riverbend
owners (the “owners”) learned that the complainants were gay,
they cancelled the reservation.94 The complainants filed a human
rights complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights
Tribunal (“Tribunal”), on the basis of section 8 of the British
Columbia Human Rights Code (the “B.C. Code”).95 The owners
denied that their conduct was discriminatory, arguing that the
cancellation was justified on the basis of their constitutionally
92

2012 BCHRT 247 (Can.).
Id. at para 1.
94
Id. at para. 2.
95
The B.C. Code is legislation aimed at prohibiting discrimination in such
areas as employment, housing, and the provision of services, absent a bona
fide and reasonable justification for the discrimination. Id. at para. 95 (quoting
British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, § 8(1)).
Section 8(1) of the British Columbia Human Rights Code provides as follows:
A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable
justification,
(a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation,
service or facility customarily available to the public, or
(b) discriminate against a person or class of persons
regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily
available to the public . . . .
British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, § 8(1).
93
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protected right to freedom of religion.96
The Tribunal found for the complainants, holding that the
owners had refused to provide service because of the
complainants’ sexual orientation, that the owners had not proven
a bona fide and reasonable justification for the discrimination,
and could not rely on any of the other exemptions in the B.C.
Code. Some of the remedies included: a declaration that the
owners’ conduct was discriminatory, an order for the owners to
cease and desist from this and similar conduct, and an order that
the owners pay each complainant a modest sum for the indignity
and humiliation each had suffered.97 Although the Eadie Tribunal
reached the correct result, its analysis was strained and flawed.
Based as it was on contemporary human rights
(antidiscrimination) law, it did not use the appropriate tools to
adequately address a conflict of rights.
The Tribunal’s analysis began well, carefully evaluating
evidence to establish the context, including the beliefs of the
owners and the harms caused to the complainants resulting from
the discrimination.98 The Tribunal also properly considered and
rejected the sexual identity/behaviour distinction and reached the
correct conclusion that the complainants had made out a prima
facie case of discrimination.99 The challenges in this case arose in
the next phase of the analysis, when the Tribunal followed the
prescribed steps to evaluate whether the owners had a bona fide
and reasonable justification (“BFRJ”) for their discriminatory
conduct.100 The BFRJ test proved unhelpful in resolving the
issues, and did not allow for nuance or a balancing of the
conflicting rights. In its BFRJ analysis, the Tribunal defined the
Eadie, 2012 BCHRT 247 at para. 2. The Tribunal did not have
jurisdiction over constitutional questions per se. However the question of
equality versus freedom of religion was properly before the Tribunal, as it had
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the antidiscrimination provisions of the B.C.
Code using normal principles of statutory interpretation, including an
interpretation informed by Charter values.
97
Id. at para. 173.
98
Id. at paras. 1–95.
99
Id. at paras. 96–115.
100
Id. at para. 116.
96
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function of the service provider in an absolutist manner that
effectively determined the outcome of the complaint;101 applied a
spectrum analysis to evaluate the religiosity of the service
provider,102 and in this as well, came to a conclusion lacking in
nuance; and conducted a superficial analysis of two other
statutory exemptions that it found to be inapplicable to the
complaint.103 A proportionality analysis of the kind employed in
constitutional cases under section 1 of the Charter would have
been more direct in raising and assessing the relevant issues, and
it would have allowed for the kinds of nuance and balancing
necessary in a conflict of rights situation.

1. Establishing Prima Facie Discrimination; Evidence of
Religious Beliefs and the Impact of Discrimination; and Sexual
Orientation vs. Sexual Behaviour
The decision in Eadie began with the Tribunal taking the time
to consider evidence concerning not only the events that
occurred, but also the beliefs of the owners and the impact of the
events on the complainants.104 All of these were important for an
in-depth contextual analysis. The owners Susan Molnar and Les
Molnar were a religious couple, active members of a Church,
who hosted religious activities in their home which was also the
Riverbend bed and breakfast.105 The Riverbend itself had no
direct connection to the Church.106 The owners’ beliefs about sex
and sin, the role of their home religiously, and their belief in God
were all recounted by the Tribunal.107 These included a belief that
all sex outside of a committed, heterosexual marriage is a sin,
and that the owners are responsible for what takes place in their
home.108
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Eadie, 2012 BCHRT 247 at para. 144.
Id. at para. 125.
Id. at paras. 125–26.
Id. at paras. 1–80.
Id. at paras. 11–17.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at paras. 11–17.
Id. at paras. 15–17.
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The complainants Shaun Eadie and Brian Thomas were a gay
couple.109 The Tribunal took the time to describe the emotional
and psychological impact of the cancellation on the complainants.
This included a description of the bullying, demeaning conduct,
and bigotry the complainants had faced since childhood, and how
the incident with the Riverbend caused one complainant to
“return” to a childhood in which he was shunned and excluded.
The Tribunal described how the one complainant had since
established his self-confidence, but the refusal shocked and
devastated him. The Tribunal also detailed how angry, emotional,
and disturbed both complainants felt as a result of the
cancellation, and how they had experienced this as an affront to
their dignity.110
In this case—as in many belief-based exemption cases—there
was an attempt by the owners to distinguish between sexual
behaviour and sexual orientation. Mr. Molnar argued that his
concern was with sexual conduct in his home and therefore he
might have considered an “amicable” arrangement, such as
providing two rooms and receiving assurances from the
complainants that they would do nothing offensive to the owners’
beliefs (i.e. no sexual conduct).111 The Tribunal in Eadie rejected
this orientation/conduct distinction both as a matter of fact 112 and
of law. In support of the latter conclusion, the Tribunal cited,
among others, the 2005 B.C. Human Rights Tribunal decision of
Hayes v. Barker:113
[T]he ground of sexual orientation is not
exclusively status or identity based, but also
protects against discrimination on the basis of
behaviours engaged in as a result of a person’s
orientation. If it were otherwise, the prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
would offer scant protection indeed. Such an
109
110
111
112

Id. at para. 1.
Id. at paras. 77–80.
Id. at para. 58.

The Tribunal found that Mr. Molnar had cancelled the complainants’
reservation because they were a gay couple. Id. at para. 115.
113
2005 BCHRT 590 (Can.).

2014.05.05 AVIV.DOCX

5/11/2014 12:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

642

interpretation would prohibit a person from being
fired for “being” gay, while doing nothing to
prohibit a gay man being fired for having sex with
his male partner . . . .114
The Tribunal also rejected the owners’ hypothetical
“amicable” arrangement on the grounds that the complainants
should not be required to make assurances in order to access a
service.115 One of the complainants expressed his concerns with
such an arrangement as follows: “[I]t would have been the same
as asking a person of colour to enter from a separate door.”116
In conclusion, the Tribunal was satisfied that the complainants
had made out the first part of the complaint, having established a
prima facie case of discrimination.117 It was now open to the
owners, under the B.C. Code, to attempt to prove a bona fide and
reasonable justification for the discrimination.118 The owners tried
to do so on the basis of their religious beliefs.119

2. The Bona Fide and Reasonable Justification Defence;
Defining the Service; the Spectrum Analysis; Intimacy of the
Service; and a Balancing Test
Both the complainants and the owners in Eadie relied on a
2005 B.C. Human Rights Tribunal belief-based exemption case
called Smith v. Knights of Columbus,120 which also focused on
the BFRJ analysis. The Knights of Columbus was a Catholic
Eadie, 2012 BCHRT 247 at para. 114 (citing Hayes, 2005 BCHRT
590, at para. 22).
115
Id. at para. 144.
116
Id. at para. 66.
117
Id. at para. 115.
118
The elements of a bona fide and reasonable justification are: (1) the
respondents adopted a standard, rule, or goal that is rationally connected to the
function; (2) they adopted the rule in good faith, in the belief that it was
necessary to the fulfillment of the purpose or goal; and (3) the standard was
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose or goal, in that the
respondents could not accommodate the individual without incurring undue
hardship. Id. at paras. 116–17.
119
Id. at paras. 128–30.
120
2005 BCHRT 544 (Can.).
114
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men’s organization that rented out a Church-owned and Churchaffiliated banquet hall to Parish church groups, as well as to the
general public. While there were no restrictions publicized, the
Parish priest had the final word on which activities were
permissible in the hall.121 In Knights, a couple had rented the hall
for their wedding reception, but when the organization learned
that the rental was for a reception following a same-sex wedding
contrary to the Church’s teachings, they cancelled the
reservation.122
The Knights decision is notable for certain problematic
aspects of its analysis. The Tribunal in Knights did declare,
correctly, that “while everyone is entitled to hold and manifest
their own sincerely held religious beliefs and to declare those
beliefs, . . . [this] right is not absolute.”123 In effect, however, the
reasoning of the Knights Tribunal provided near-absolute
protection for the organization’s freedom of religion in the public
domain.
Following the prescribed steps for a BFRJ analysis,124 the
Knights Tribunal had to determine certain concepts to be applied
in the test, namely: the rule or standard that led to the prima facie
discrimination; and the function of the service at issue. The
Knights Tribunal made these determinations in a manner that
incorporated religious belief, effectively deciding the outcome of
the analysis through these determinations.125 The Knights
Tribunal determined that the rule adopted by the Knights
organization was: the organization does not rent out the hall for
purposes “contrary to its core [Catholic] beliefs.”126 The function
of the service was determined to be: renting the hall in ways that

would not undermine the organization’s relationship with the
Catholic Church or conflict with the beliefs of the members of the
organization.127 Given that both the rule that led to the denial of
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. paras. 1, 6.
Id.
Id. at para. 93.
See supra note 116
Knights of Columbus, 2005 BCHRT 544 at paras. 108–09.
Id. at para. 108 (emphasis added).
Id. at para. 88.
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service and the function of the service were defined in connection
with the beliefs of the Church and/or of the organization, it is no
wonder that the Knights Tribunal concluded that this rule was
rationally connected to this function.128
As to the question of whether the Knights could have
accommodated the complainants without undue hardship,129 the
Tribunal conducted a “spectrum analysis” to evaluate where the
case fell on the spectrum between upholding the service
providers’ freedom of religion, and the equality rights of the
complainants. The Tribunal held that the further the act of prima
facie discrimination from the service provider’s core religious
beliefs, the less it would be likely to be justified. The Tribunal
found, further, that in the case at bar, the hall fell somewhere on
the continuum between a parish church, that would not have been
required to act against its religious beliefs, and a purely
commercial space with no religious affiliation, in which case the
complainants would have been entitled to rent the space.
Interestingly, the Knights Tribunal referred to Brockie as an
example of just such a commercial enterprise.130 The Tribunal
concluded that:
a person, with a sincerely held religious belief
cannot be compelled to act in a manner that
conflict[s] with that belief, even if that act is in the
public domain . . . . [T]he Knights are entitled to
this constitutional protection and therefore cannot

be compelled to act in a manner that is contrary to
their core religious beliefs.131

Even though the respondents were not being asked to
participate in the solemnization of a same-sex marriage, the
Tribunal decided, renting the hall for its celebration would have
required the organization to indirectly condone the celebration of
a same-sex marriage, contrary to the members’ core religious

128
129
130
131

Id. at para. 89.
Id. at paras 91–92.
Id. at paras. 106–10.
Id. at para. 113 (emphasis added).
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beliefs.132 This absolutist position, whereby the organization’s
core beliefs should not be violated, may be more extreme than the
problematic “objective” standard adopted by the Court in
Brockie.133
Despite this, the Knights Tribunal found for the complainants
on the narrow ground that the Knights had not accommodated the
complainants in a manner that did not violate the respondents’
beliefs. Such accommodation could have included, according to
the Tribunal: meeting with the complainants, explaining the
situation to them, formally apologizing, reimbursing them
immediately, and possibly offering them assistance to find
another venue.134
The BFRJ analysis in Knights raises a number of difficulties,
demonstrating certain analytical positions that should be avoided
in belief-based exemption cases. First, in Knights, the religious
nature of the organization appears to have trumped other factors,
such as the extremely tenuous connection between the service
provider and the service. In contrast, for example, to Mr.
Brockie the printer, who presumably would have had to be
personally involved to some extent in producing the requested
material, the organization in Knights did not appear to have had a
connection to the event other than through the rather impersonal
act of renting out the hall; and even that was for the wedding
reception, not the ceremony itself. Indeed, the identity of the
organization as service provider appears to have been
determinative for the Tribunal, as it stated in its spectrum
analysis that it would not require the Catholic Church to rent its
Parish Church space for the reception against its core religious
beliefs, but that it would have no difficulty compelling a
commercial enterprise, such as that in Brockie, to rent its hall.135
It is not clear how the Tribunal reconciled this reasoning with its
conclusion that it would not force any person with a sincerely
held religious belief to act against that belief. After all, Mr.

132
133
134
135

Id.
See supra notes 32–48 and accompanying text.
Knights of Columbus, 2005 BCHRT 544 at paras. 127–28.
Id. at para. 109.
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Brockie was the owner of just such a business, and a commercial
marriage hall might be owned by someone with views similar to
those of the Knights. An additional difficulty arises in this regard.
The premise of the spectrum analysis as applied in this case
seems to create an exemption based on the religious identity of
the service provider. However, the B.C. Code already has an
exemption for religious organizations, an exemption that did not
apply in this case. At the least, the Tribunal should have
attempted to reconcile its spectrum-analysis exemption with the
existing statutory exemption.
Second, the Tribunal adopted an absolutist position—that it
would not have forced the organization to do anything that
violated is members’ core beliefs, even in the public domain—
which is wrong both in principle and in law. The logic in Knights
could lead to even more severe and absurd results, as it would
seem to justify any discrimination as long as there was a sincerely
held core religious belief. What if, for example, the Knights
organization, on the basis of a sincerely held religious belief,
refused to work with LGBTQ couples, would not refer them to
another venue, and perhaps even felt it immoral to be near with
them (and therefore put up signs in the window indicating that
LGBTQ people would not be served)? On the logic of the Knights
Tribunal, this discriminatory conduct could be justified and may
be protected. The Tribunal’s absolutist reasoning undermines the
very basis of the human rights antidiscrimination laws, which
were designed specifically to compel people to act against their
convictions if those convictions would lead to discriminatory
results. To be fair, it is hard to know whether the Knights
Tribunal intended to take such an extreme position, given its
conclusion that the organization had in fact discriminated.
The Eadie Tribunal, in the first part of is BFRJ analysis, used
similar reasoning, but reached a different conclusion as to the
function of the service being provided by the Riverbend. This
Tribunal accepted that the Riverbend owners sincerely believed
allowing a same-sex couple to share a bed in their home would
harm the owners’ relationship to their Lord.136 Nonetheless, the
136

Eadie v. Riverbend Bed & Breakfast, 2012 BCHRT 247, para. 139.
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Tribunal found that the owners had not established a bona fide
and reasonable justification for their discriminatory conduct.137
Here, as in Knights, the conclusion hinged on the definition of
the function of the service. In Eadie, the Tribunal defined the
function of the bed and breakfast without reference to the owners’
religious views, finding that the Riverbend’s function was to
provide temporary accommodation to the general public.138
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded, the rule excluding couples
who were not a married man and woman was not rationally
connected to this purpose of providing temporary
accommodation.139 The two cases together provide a clear
illustration of how the definition of the service’s function
effectively determines the rest of the analysis, but is not helpful in
resolving the belief-based exemption cases. If the function is
defined, as in Knights, in relation to the service providers’
religious beliefs, they will be granted near-absolute protection for
these beliefs, subject to the duty to accommodate. If the function
is defined without reference to the service providers’ religious
beliefs, as in Eadie, they will be left without any protection,
despite the fact that they appear to have believed just as fervently
as the Knights did that their business should be run without
harming their relationship with their Church or with their Lord.
Such absolutist conclusions in both cases do not leave room for
nuance or balancing.
For the sake of caution, the Eadie Tribunal did not stop at the
first part of the BFRJ analysis. In its decision on the third part of
the analysis assessing the duty to accommodate, the Tribunal
addressed a number of issues. It considered the argument that the
Riverbend was in the owners’ home.140 The Tribunal held that
there was no statutory exception available for “services” in a
situation of shared sleeping, bathroom, or cooking facilities, to
parallel the statutory exception for tenancy in such

(Can.).
137
138
139
140

Id. at para. 145.
Id. at para. 141.
Id. at para. 144.
Id. at paras. 151–53.
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circumstances.141 The Tribunal concluded that those parts of the
Riverbend occupied by guests were properly characterized as
business premises.142 What underlies this formalistic discussion
may be the idea that intimacy between service provider and the
recipients of the service could in very exceptional cases justify a
belief-based exemption, or minimize the duty to accommodate.
No such level of intimacy was reached by renting a room in a bed
and breakfast.
Next, the Eadie Tribunal considered the religiosity of the
Riverbend. It conducted a spectrum analysis, concluding that the
Riverbend was “more toward the commercial end of the
spectrum . . . . While the business was operated by individuals
with sincere religious beliefs respecting same-sex couples, and
out of a portion of their personal residence, it was still a
commercial activity.”143
The Tribunal also considered the Riverbend’s clientele,
concluding that they were not restricted to the Christian
community.144 The Tribunal refrained from deciding whether this
would have made a difference to the decision.
The focus on religiosity seems to imply that religious
institutions who wish to discriminate in providing services to the
public could enjoy a lower duty to accommodate. As discussed
above, an exemption or diminished duty to accommodate based
on the religious identity of the service provider is rife with issues,
as it lacks nuance and does not leave room for consideration of
factors such as the impact of the harm. A test hinging on the
religiosity of the service provider may also lend itself to absolutist
conclusions, as appears to have been the case in Eadie.
The Tribunal also held that as it was the owners’ decision to
run a business in their home, in this they were not compelled by
the state to act contrary to their religious beliefs.145 The Tribunal
acknowledged that being religious practitioners in the public

141
142
143
144
145

Id. at para. 160.
Id. at para. 161.
Id. at para. 165 (emphasis added).
Id. at para. 166.
Id. at para. 165.
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domain may carry a cost (in money, tradition, or inconvenience),
but stated that such costs are less serious than a limit that
effectively deprives the adherent of any meaningful choice with
respect to their practice.146 Having decided that the owners were
not deprived of a meaningful choice with respect to the exercise
of their religion, the Tribunal concluded:
[T]heir choice or mode of business operation may
be limited by their religious practice. Having
entered into the commercial sphere, the Molnars
(owners), like other business people, were required
to comply with the laws of the Province, including
the Code, which is quasi-constitutional legislation
that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.147
Thus the Eadie Tribunal appeared to be saying that business
people who choose to enter the commercial sphere may not
discriminate. This too is near-absolutist reasoning, as the
Tribunal appeared to be ruling out religious freedom exemptions
for any person providing services in the public domain who is not
acting in furtherance of a religious goal. This included the
owners, despite their strong personal religious views. It could
also include a female massage therapist who, for religious
reasons, does not accept adult male customers.
The Tribunal’s reasoning on this point is not persuasive.
Harms to religious freedom are constitutional infringements,
which must be acknowledged as such and balanced against the
relevant countervailing interests, as discussed below. It is also
unpersuasive to assert that “simply” asking people to change their
mode of business does not constitute an interference with their
freedom of religion. Asking people to change or move their
business because they are not in compliance with the law is
coercive, whether the owner chooses to shut down their business
(as the owners did subsequently in Eadie) or to comply with the
law against their own convictions. Such coercion may be
justified, as it was in Eadie, but the impact on the owners can
146
147

Id. at para. 168
Id. at para. 169.
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nonetheless still be acknowledged.
What the analyses in Knights and Eadie demonstrate are the
challenges created when trying to balance equality with freedom
of religion within a bona fide and reasonable justification test as
applied in these cases. The Tribunals engaged in awkward
discussions and reached unlikely conclusions, inserting religious
beliefs into the function of a wedding hall and determining that a
bed and breakfast was “more” on the commercial end of the
spectrum. A straightforward balancing exercise, like that under
section 1 of the Charter, would be preferable,148 similar to that
conducted by the courts in Marriage Commissioners and in
Brockie.149 Though the court reached the wrong conclusion in the
latter case, these courts were able to ask themselves the correct
questions and consider nuanced solutions.
On the facts in Eadie, a balancing exercise could consider the
equality rights of the complainants, assess the actual harms they
suffered, as well as the social context and greater harms that may
occur if the owners could single out LGBTQ people for
discrimination. It could weigh this against the religious freedom
of the owners, the actual harms they would suffer if prohibited
from discriminating, and the greater social context. In a beliefbased exemption case such as this, one party or the other may end
up feeling forced out of the public domain. Indeed, some might
consider this to have been the fate of the Riverbend owners, who
did in fact leave the public domain and shut down their bed and
breakfast following the Tribunal’s decision prohibiting them from
discriminating. If anyone has to leave the public domain, in most
instances, it likely should be those who want to be kept apart, to
exclude or discriminate.
Moreover, in the Eadie and Knights cases, as well as the
148

This appears to be the method proposed by the Ontario Human Rights
Commission for those situations where reconciliation is not possible. See
ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, POLICY ON COMPETING HUMAN RIGHTS
(2012), available at http://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/policy%20
on%20competing%20human%20rights_accessible_2.pdf.
149
In re Marriage Comm’rs Appointed under the Marriage Act, 2011
SCKA 3 (Can.); Ontario Human Rights Comm’n v. Brockie (2002), 161
O.A.C. 324 (Can. On. Sup. Ct. J.).
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others discussed in this Article, it is likely no coincidence that
those who created the exclusionary rule were those with greater
social capital, while those who would have been excluded
belonged to a group that has experienced, and continues to
experience, discrimination and marginalization. This too may be
relevant context in determining the outcome of these cases. Had
the Eadie Tribunal engaged in such a balancing exercise, it could
have concluded, as this Article would, that the individual and
social benefits of preventing discrimination against a couple on
the basis of their sexual orientation in the specific, social, and
historical context of this case outweigh the deleterious impact on
the owners.
This conclusion, that the owners in Eadie should not be
permitted to discriminate, is simple albeit coercive. However,
there is nothing earth-shattering in the proposition that law
coerces. The human rights laws work ex ante by prohibiting
discrimination, and ex post facto by enforcing coercive measures
where discrimination has taken place. The coercive nature of
these laws has not changed since they were first established with
the purpose of forcing individuals and businesses to serve,
employ, and house people of different religions and races, against
the sometimes deeply held convictions of those who would have
otherwise discriminated. The importance of the antidiscrimination
measures justifies the creation of these coercive human rights
laws and continues to justify their implementation. This is
particularly true for anti-LGBTQ discrimination in the current
Canadian context. That said, it is still necessary for a court or
Tribunal to examine each belief-based exemption case on its
facts.

D. Reference re Constitutional Act, 1978 (Saskatchewan):150
Should Civil Marriage Commissioners Be Exempt From
Solemnizing Marriages Contrary to Their Religious
Beliefs?
In 2004 and 2005, same-sex marriage was legally recognized
150

In re Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SCKA 3.
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across Canada following a series of constitutional challenges151
and ultimately, new federal legislation.152 This tremendous change
raised a new legal and constitutional question with respect to
belief-based exemptions. In the province of Saskatchewan, eight
marriage commissioners resigned after being informed that they
were required to perform same-sex marriage ceremonies, while
others filed human rights complaints claiming that their freedom
of religion and their right to carry on an occupation without
religious discrimination had been violated. Other human rights
complaints and litigation followed.
Eventually, the Lieutenant Governor in Council asked the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to provide an advisory opinion,
known as a reference, on the constitutionality of two alternative
possible amendments to the province’s Marriage Act.153 The
court’s opinion, although not legally binding, was provided in the
form of a judicial decision: this is the Marriage Commissioners
decision.154 The two possible amendments under consideration in
this case, if passed into law, would have created a belief-based
exemption for marriage commissioners by allowing them to
decline to solemnize a marriage if it would be contrary to their
religious beliefs. The first option would have made the exemption
available only to those marriage commissioners appointed on or
before November 5, 2004—the date on which the courts in
Saskatchewan recognized same-sex marriage.155 The second
See, e.g., W. (N.) v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 2004 SKQB 434 (Can.);
Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2003] O.J. No. 2268 (QL), sub nom.,
Halpern v. Toronto (2003), 172 O.A.C. 276 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Ligue
Catholique pour les droits de l’homme c. Hendricks, [2004] Q.J.No. 2593
(Can. Que.), sub nom., Hendricks c. Québec (Procureure générale), [2004]
R.J.Q. 851 (Can. Que. C.A.); EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.),
2003 BCCA 251 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
152
Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.).
153
The Marriage Act, 1995, S.S. 1995, c. M-4.1 (Can.). The Lieutenant
Governor in Council is the Saskatchewan Cabinet, with the approval of the
Lieutenant Governor.
154
2011 SKCA 3 (Can.).
155
The operative part of the first option reads as follows:
28.1(1) Notwithstanding The Saskatchewan Human Rights
Code, a marriage commissioner who was appointed on or
151
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option would have made the exemption available to all marriage
commissioners in the province, regardless of the date of their
appointment.156 The court’s analysis addressed both possible
exemptions together.
The court held that these exemptions would, if enacted, be
unconstitutional and invalid: they would violate the equality rights
of LGBTQ individuals guaranteed in section 15 of the Charter;
this infringement of section 15 would be unreasonable and
unjustifiable under the Charter’s section 1 reasonable limits test,
as the proposed exemptions would not be minimally impairing,
and their harms would far outweigh their benefits.
This case, similar to Chamberlain, did not involve a private
actor in the role of service-provider. Indeed, the majority’s
decision was based in large part on the fact that marriage
commissioners act as government officials. Nonetheless, there is
a great deal in the Marriage Commissioners decision that is
helpful for exploring the issue of belief-based exemptions—for
the most part because of its contribution to this debate, in
particular its section 1 analysis, but also, with respect, because of
its flaws. The issues raised include the following: whether the
purpose of the proposed exemptions was to protect religious
freedom or to facilitate discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation;157 who may define religious beliefs, and the oft-cited
yet problematic distinction between religious beliefs and acts; the
deleterious effects of the exemptions, and their impact on
individuals and society, particularly if institutionalized and
before November 5, 2004 is not required to solemnize a
marriage if:
(a) to do so would be contrary to the marriage
commissioner’s religious beliefs; and
(b) the marriage commissioner has filed the notice
mentioned in subsection (2) within the period mentioned
in that subsection.
Id. at para. 17.
156
The second option reads: “28.1 Notwithstanding The Saskatchewan
Human Rights Code, a marriage commissioner is not required to solemnize a
marriage if to do so would be contrary to the marriage commissioner’s
religious beliefs.” Id.
157
Id. at paras. 74, 78–79, 115.
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legitimized through official policy; and again, the slippery slope
of exemptions that could be justified if the proposed exemptions
were permitted.158 This Article shares many of the court’s
conclusions, but differs on the question of religious freedom and
the right of individuals to define their religious views and
priorities for themselves.

1. Factual Background, Charter Analysis, Equality, the LGBTQSpecific Context, and the Purpose of the Exemptions
The court’s factual findings established the background to this
case, as follows: marriage commissioners in Saskatchewan are
appointed by the Minister and provide the only route to marriage
for individuals who want a nonreligious ceremony.159 Indeed, the
Marriage Act specifies the requirements and the wording for a
civil ceremony—and these are strictly nonreligious. Individuals
wanting a civil marriage may receive contact information through
the provincial government, following which they can contact a
commissioner directly.160 According to the court, this route would
be the only one available to many gay and lesbian couples who
want to get married.161
The two proposed amendments to the province’s Marriage
Act at issue162 would have exempted all or some of these civil
marriage commissioners from the duty to solemnize a marriage,
if doing so would be contrary to their religious beliefs.163 The
court was asked to provide its opinion on the constitutional
validity of these proposed exemptions. Applying the established
test, the court began its analysis by considering whether the
proposed exemptions infringed a Charter right or freedom. It
concluded that the exemptions did in fact violate the right to
equality under section 15 of the Charter. It then fell to the court
158
159
160
161

Id. at para. 90.
Id. at para. 9.
Id. at para. 8.
Id. at para. 9.

The Marriage Act, 1995, S.S. 1995, c. M-4.1 (Can.); see also supra
notes 155–56.
163
See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
162
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to determine whether the exemptions constituted a reasonable
limit on this right such that they could be justified under section 1
of the Charter.164
Applying the section 1 analysis to the exemptions, the court
first considered the purpose of the exemptions. The majority
(though not the concurrence) held that the purpose of the
exemptions—to protect freedom of religion—was pressing and
substantial, thus satisfying this branch of the test.165 Second, the
majority held that the proposed amendments were rationally
connected to this purpose, in that the exemptions would indeed
protect marriage commissioners’ religious freedom.166 However,
on the third—minimal impairment branch of the section 1
analysis—the majority found that the exemptions were more
restrictive than necessary to achieve their objective.167 Given the
possibility of an alternative method for matching couples with
marriage commissioners—a method that would have harmed
equality rights less than the proposed exemptions—the majority
concluded that the exemptions were not minimally impairing, not
a reasonable limit on the right to equality, and as such, they were
unconstitutional.168 The court decided to provide its opinion as
well on the fourth, and final, branch of the section 1 analysis and
concluded that the deleterious effects of the exemptions far
outweighed their salutary effects. For this reason as well, the
exemptions did not constitute a reasonable limit and were
unconstitutional.
Aspects of the court’s Charter analysis raise interesting,
insightful, helpful, at times controversial, and even troubling
elements, all of which are illuminating in the context of a larger
discussion about belief-based exemptions. It is these elements that
will be drawn out for a more detailed discussion below.
In the initial stage of its Charter analysis, the majority
considered whether the proposed exemptions infringed a Charter
164

text.
165
166
167
168

For the reasonable limits test, see supra notes 7–9 and accompanying

Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SKCA 3 at para. 82.
Id.
Id. at para. 88.
Id. at para. 101.
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right. It concluded that the exemptions would curtail the Charter’s
right to equality under section 15. Its conclusion was based on the
following findings: an exemption could lead to any number of
commissioners refusing to perform same-sex marriages; the
impact of such refusals on an LGBTQ couple could be very
significant and genuinely offensive; and even if a few
commissioners opted out of performing same-sex marriages,
LGBTQ couples looking for a commissioner might face some
inconvenience, could have to deal with numerous refusals, and
they may encounter real difficulty in small or remote locations.
Also, in light of historical discrimination and mistreatment of
LGBTQ individuals, allowing marriage commissioners to refuse a
same-sex couple service “would clearly be a retrograde step—a
step that would perpetuate disadvantage and involve stereotypes
about the worthiness of same-sex unions.”169
In the next stage, it was necessary to conduct a Charter
section 1 analysis to determine whether the infringement of the
right to equality could be justified as a reasonable limit on this
right. If so, the exemptions would be constitutional. To begin the
section 1 analysis, the court needed to establish the purpose of the
proposed exemptions. These exemptions were drafted broadly
and would have allowed a marriage commissioner to refuse to
perform any kind of marriage, such as an inter-faith union.170
And indeed, the majority found that the purpose of the
exemptions was to protect the religious freedom of marriage
commissioners by relieving them of their duty to perform any
marriage contrary to their religious beliefs.171 That said, Justice
Richards, writing for the majority, focused his analysis
specifically on one kind of situation—a refusal to solemnize the
marriage of a same-sex couple—as there was no evidence of any
other kind of refusal and because same-sex marriage was in fact
the issue underlying the debate.172
The concurrence delivered by Justice Smith went further,
In re Marriage Comm’rs Appointed under the Marriage Act, 2011
SKCA 3, para 45 (Can.).
170
Id. at para. 24.
171
Id. at para. 76.
172
Id. at paras. 104–09.
169
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considering, clarifying, and redefining the purpose of the
proposed exemptions.173 According to the concurrence, the
objective of the exemptions was not simply to accommodate the
religious freedom of marriage commissioners, but to permit
marriage commissioners to refuse to perform same-sex marriage
ceremonies when doing so would conflict with their religious
beliefs.174 The facts underlying this conclusion were not difficult
to demonstrate, particularly given that one of the two proposed
exemptions was drafted specifically as a grandfathering option for
those marriage commissioners appointed on or before the date
that same-sex marriage was recognized in Saskatchewan. The
concurring opinion concluded that this objective was not
“pressing and substantial,” as required by section 1 of the
Charter, or at the least it was doubtful whether this objective met
the required threshold.175
What is particularly useful here is the insistence (by the
concurrence, and perhaps in its wake, the majority), that the
analysis be situated in its specific context. In this case, the issue
was not simply one of religious freedom versus equality. It was
squarely about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
And those who would be most harmed by the exemptions’
discriminatory effect were LGBTQ individuals. Providing
detailed context and considering the identity, circumstances, and
history of those who would be impacted by the denial of service
will be critical for various stages of the analysis in any beliefbased exemption case.

2. Minimal Impairment and the Single Entry Point System
As to whether such a limit on equality rights was justifiable,
the court found that the exemptions failed the minimal
impairment test,176 as there was at least one alternative system
that could harm individuals’ equality rights less than the proposed
173
174
175
176

Id. at paras. 115–30.
Id. at para. 154.
Id. at para. 152.

The minimal impairment test requires that for a limit to be reasonable,
it must “limit rights no more than necessary.” Id. at para. 83.
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exemptions.177 This alternative, known as the “single entry point”
system,178 would allow couples seeking a marriage commissioner
to apply through a central office, at which point they would
provide information about themselves (i.e., their genders). After
this, the Director of the Marriage Unit would provide them with a
list of available commissioners. The list provided to the couple
would exclude those commissioners not prepared to officiate—all
of which could have been established privately and “behind the
scenes.”179 Such a system, the majority held, would be less
harmful than the proposed exemptions, as it would accommodate
marriage commissioners’ beliefs; the accommodation would not
be readily apparent to an LGBTQ couple; and the couple would
not risk being refused service because of their sexual orientation.
The court, however, was careful to explain that the discussion
about the single entry point system did not prove the system’s
constitutionality. It only served to prove the lack of
constitutionality of the proposed exemptions which would be even
more harmful to individuals’ equality rights.180
The single entry point system is indeed flawed. While it could
mercifully shield LGBTQ couples arranging their weddings from
the indignity and pain of a refusal, it would still include a request
for information about a person’s gender, which should be
irrelevant once same-sex marriage is recognized, and which is
always problematic for transgender people. This system would
also do nothing to shield the people “behind the scenes” from
having to work with and implement this policy. Marriage
commissioners and their associates, the Director of the Marriage
Unit, and clerical and technical staff may themselves be LGBTQ,
have a loved one who is, and/or have a deeply held belief in the
equality, dignity, and worth of all people. Being required to work
with a single entry point system would require such individuals to
fill out forms, enter data, manage lists, and so forth in a context
that would facilitate the singling out of LGBTQ people for
177

Indeed, there was a suggestion that a system of this kind operated in
Toronto. Id. at para. 87.
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Id. at para. 85.
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exclusion. As will be discussed below, the very creation of an
official ex ante policy allowing people to opt out of performing
same-sex marriages sends a problematic message legitimizing this
refusal.181

3. Salutary Effects and Defining Religious Beliefs
On the final branch of the section 1 analysis, the court
engaged in a balancing exercise to weigh the deleterious effects of
the exemptions against their salutary ones.182 The exemptions’
benefits, the majority stated, were intended to protect marriage
commissioners from having to do certain actions contrary to their
religious beliefs. While these beliefs may be significant for some
commissioners, the majority held that the benefits of the
exemptions were less significant than they appear because:
the freedom of religion interests [that the
exemptions] accommodate do not lie at the heart of
[section] 2(a) of the Charter. [The exemptions] are
concerned only with the ability of marriage
commissioners to act on their beliefs in the world
at large. They do not in any way concern the
freedom of commissioners to hold the religious
beliefs they choose or to worship as they wish.183
While agreeing with the majority’s conclusion that the
exemptions’ harms far outweigh their benefits, this Article does
not accept the distinction, invoked as well by the concurrence,
between acting on beliefs and holding them as an appropriate
method of determining the significance of a restriction. More
generally, and with respect, the proposition that in defining a
person’s religious freedom, courts can rely on the distinction
between “belief and conduct”184—a distinction frequently cited in
freedom of religion and equality cases—may be factually
See infra Part II.D.4. This point was made by the concurrence about
the exemptions themselves. Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SKCA 3 at para. 107.
182
Id. at para. 90.
183
Id. at para. 93.
184
See, e.g., Trinity W. Univ. v. Coll. of Teachers (1998), 169 D.L.R.
4th 234, para. 36 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
181
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inaccurate and is philosophically unsound. This distinction
privileges one subjective understanding of religion over others.
While it is true that some religions are based primarily on faith
and worship, there is a diversity of religious and spiritual
systems, expressions, and practices that should not be
overlooked. For some adherents and religions, faith or attendance
at a house of worship may be less religiously and spiritually
significant than, for example: acts of charity; ethical behaviour
(whether others agree or not with aspects of these ethical
systems); or ways of being in the world (including dietary
regimes, modes of dress, and laws around sexual behaviour). In
other words, for many adherents, their core religious freedom
may be dependent on the freedom to conduct themselves
according to a system of ethics and practices prescribed by their
religion. This is not to say that one can never limit religious
practices—such limits can and should take place in various
situations, including the case under discussion. However, a
meaningful analysis should rely on the actual religious worldview
of the individual in question, not on the court’s subjective beliefs
about what constitutes religion.
The concurring opinion also dealt with the questions of how
to define—and who should define—religious beliefs deserving of
section 2(a) freedom. For instance, given the nonreligious nature
of civil marriage and the importance of the civil scheme, the
concurrence asked “in precisely what respect being compelled to
perform a same-sex marriage can offend the religious freedom of
a marriage commissioner.”185 Justice Smith’s intention, she
explained, was not to question the sincerity of the belief, but
rather to examine the significance of the societal harm the
exemptions are intended to remedy and to what extent freedom of
religion is offended by requiring marriage commissioners to
perform same-sex marriages.186
This is, with respect, a strange question. If a person were
asked to participate in a ritual that was offensive to their sincere
moral or ethical core, surely this would be a violation of section
185
186

Marriage Comm’rs, 2011 SKCA 3 at para. 129.
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2(a). Like equality, freedom of religion is a value. And this value
would be harmed if people were required to act against their
beliefs (including beliefs as to how they may and may not conduct
themselves). It will nonetheless be open to a court to determine
whether another conflicting value, such as equality, will receive
greater protection in a particular context.
The concurrence also turned to the evidence and analysed the
beliefs expressed by various affiants, including the following
statement: “[M]onogamous, non-polygamous, heterosexual
marriage is . . . a uniquely Christian doctrine. A Christian must
always recognize marriage as such, and understand that any
attempt on the part of society to define it in any other way is
disobedience to the Covenant and incurs the righteous judgment
of God.”187 The concurrence attempted to demonstrate that
refusals to perform same-sex marriage are not reasonable,
plausible, or compliant with the law. Justice Smith also held that
performing a same-sex marriage does not necessarily imply
approval of the union. And she asserted that “[t]he performance
of a civil marriage by a marriage commissioner under the Act is
not a religious rite or practice. Nor does the requirement to do so
limit or restrict religious belief.”188
Justice Smith’s analysis with respect to defining religious
beliefs and freedom was erroneous. First, the concurrence was
asking itself the wrong questions when it tried to assess the
reasonableness, plausibility, or legal coherence of the refusals.
Religious beliefs do not become less religiously true just because
they may be unreasonable or implausible. Second, Justice Smith
held that performing a marriage does not imply approval of the
marriage. While this assertion may be true for the respected
Justice, it directly contradicts the evidence of the affiants who
expressed concerns about condoning or approving of these unions
by virtue of solemnizing the marriages, as cited by Justice Smith
herself. Finally, the concurrence seemed to suggest that only
religious rites can be relevant to an infringement of a person’s
religious belief. This suggestion is unfounded. If a person is
187
188
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forced to violate a religious prohibition (such as eating pork,
having a blood transfusion,189 or removing a religiously mandated
ritual object),190 this may well be a violation of their religious
freedom even where no religious rite is involved.
The question of how to define “core” religiosity or significant
harms to religious freedom is one that recurs in the equality and
freedom of religion cases. With respect, the concurrence’s
analysis in this regard seemed to demonstrate a conceptual
difficulty in grasping the nature of religious or conscientious
belief and practice. This was particularly evident from the fact
that Justice Smith found only a weak to nonexistent interference
with religious freedom, despite having cited to an affidavit
expressing an individual’s fear about incurring “the righteous
judgment of God.”191
Religious beliefs (with respect to worship, conduct, and
practice) are subjective and personal. Their range and expression
may be diverse, their content may be irrational and idiosyncratic,
and they may contain values that are anathema to others. Courts
and tribunals adjudicating belief-based exemption cases should
engage in a serious contemplation of freedom of religion that
allows for the possibility that such beliefs are nonetheless real for
the adherent.
It is not the role of the judge to define others’ beliefs based on
their own logic and understanding. The role of the court, when
freedom of religion is claimed, is to test the evidence with respect
to sincerity of belief and the scope of the purported harm to the
individual. It is also the courts’ role to limit these sincerely held
core beliefs if this is justified under section 1 of the Charter.

189
190

See, e.g., Manitoba v. C. (A.), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 (Can.).
See, e.g., Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoy, [2006] 1
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4. Deleterious Effects: Individual Harms and the Broader
Context, Ex Ante Permission to Exclude, and the Slippery Slope
of Exemptions
Having established a conflict between religious freedom and
equality, the critical phase of the analysis in belief-based
exemption cases may well take place in the test that weighs the
benefits of a measure against its harms. The majority in Marriage
Commissioners found that the first deleterious effect of the
proposed exemptions was the fact that they would undermine the
struggle for equality generally, and
perpetuate a brand of discrimination which our
national community has only recently begun to
successfully overcome. It would be a significant
step backward if, having won the difficult fight for
the right to same-sex civil marriages, gay and
lesbian couples could be shunned by the very
people charged by the Province with solemnizing
such unions.192
The exemptions’ second deleterious effect, according to the
majority, was in their harmful impact on individuals. To
demonstrate this, the majority cited the testimony—from a
different case in which a marriage commissioner denied service
to an LGBTQ couple—of an individual who was denied service,
giving voice to his experience and reaction. The man, M.J., had
testified as follows:
It was actually pretty devastating . . . . So when
this happened I was quite devastated. I rehashed
this I don’t know how much when I couldn’t sleep
because I actually wound up sleeping very little. I
was just crushed about it. I couldn’t believe that as
a human being I wasn’t going to be treated as a
real person.193
The majority found that the negative and harmful effects of
192
193

Id. at para. 94.
Id. at para. 95 (quoting M.J. v. Orville Nichols & Saskatchewan Att’y
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this kind of denial would affect not just those LGBTQ individuals
denied services, but the LGBTQ community, their friends and
family, and the public as a whole—as many members of the
public would be hurt and offended by the idea that a
governmental official would deny services to LGBTQ couples.194
The third and “in some ways most important” deleterious
effect of the exemptions, in the majority’s view, was that they
would undermine the principle that the government serves
everyone
equally
without
discrimination.195
Marriage
commissioners do their jobs as agents of the province. Individual
public office-holders cannot expect to change the way the office
interacts with the public to conform to their own beliefs, as this
would be inconsistent with the principle of the rule of law.196
Concurring Justice Smith discussed additional deleterious
effects that the proposed exemptions would cause. She provided a
detailed overview of the marriage solemnization regime. This
included the fact that, according to her, a significant number of
religious organizations disapprove of same-sex marriage, and
thus, civil marriage may be the only route to marriage available
for same-sex couples.197 For example, there were 138 religious
bodies whose clergy may marry according to their rites and
usages in the province, in contrast to the single prescribed form
(including a set script) for a nonreligious marriage.198 And the
number of clergy ever registered with the marriage unit (5,713)
was contrasted with the number of marriage commissioners
(578).199 These facts told a compelling story about the importance
of maintaining an open, accessible, and impartial civil marriage
option.
The concurrence also described the impact of discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and took the time to set out the
broader context responsible for the “extreme vulnerability” of

194
195
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198
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Id. at para. 45.
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LGBTQ people to hatred and discrimination.200 She cited a wellknown and painful passage that described the historic and current
disadvantages faced by this group, including: public harassment,
verbal abuse, violence, exclusion from public life, a need to
conceal identities and orientation, rejection by families, and, as a
result of these, higher rates of suicide and attempted suicide.201
Next, the concurrence explained, the harm goes further than
the individual exemptions: “[E]ven if the risk of actual refusal
were minimal, knowing that legislation would legitimize such
discrimination is in itself an affront to the dignity and worth of
homosexual individuals.”202 Thus, she concluded, what is at stake
is not just the right of same-sex couples to marry, but the right of
this vulnerable group to be free from discrimination in the
provision of a public service, which is provided without
discrimination to every other person in society.203 Justice Smith
reinforced this point by demonstrating that there was no other
legislative provision in the province explicitly operating in
conflict with the provincial Human Rights Code.204 Her insight
provides a coherent and persuasive message, demonstrating why
an official policy whose effect is to permit exclusion against a
particular group is so problematic:
Astonishingly, this clause [the exemptions] would
grant to a public official, charged with the delivery
of a public service, an immunity to the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Code not
enjoyed by any other person in this Province.
Moreover, in practice, it would deny to gays and
lesbians the protection from discrimination that the
Code provides to others. In the words of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Vriend, . . . this
clause would send “a strong and sinister message”
that “gays and lesbians are less worthy of

200
201
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203
204

Id. at para. 107.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 108.
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protection as individuals in Canada’s society.”205
The existence of an official, ex ante policy allowing
discrimination has serious consequences, whether the
discriminatory policy at issue is the exemption permitting a
marriage commissioner to refuse to marry a couple, or the single
entry point system discussed above permitting marriage
commissioners to opt out of performing these marriages behind
the scenes. Such a policy can be implemented and discussed with
co-workers, staff, and supervisors, and effectively conveys the
message that this form of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is understood, expected, tolerated, and legitimized.
Consider, by contrast, whether society would tolerate an official
system allowing people, directly or behind the scenes, to
discriminate on the basis of race or religion. The
institutionalization of discrimination may serve to perpetuate,
magnify, and increase it.
Finally, the concurrence asserted, “if the proposed
exemptions were constitutionally acceptable, [then] so too would
be virtually any legislative [exemption]”206 allowing service
providers to discriminate against same-sex couples, in the public
or private sphere, on the basis of religious disapproval of the
“same-sex lifestyle.”207 The logic underlying the exemptions,
according to Justice Smith, would be to permit marriage
commissioners to refuse to solemnize same-sex marriages, since
in their view, performing such a marriage would connote
approval of same-sex relationships, and this conflicts with their
religious beliefs.208
On this logic, Justice Smith stated, a wide range of service
providers who disapprove of same-sex relationships could also try
to justify discriminating against LGBTQ people if the disapproval
was on religious grounds, which she found it frequently is.209
These other service providers could include persons who rent
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halls for marriage celebrations, sell marriage licenses, rent living
accommodation to married couples, and provide restaurant meals
or entertainment, as mentioned above.210
It is arguable whether solemnizing a marriage is akin to
selling popcorn to a couple at a romantic movie, given the closer
nexus of the marriage commissioner and greater degree of
personal involvement in the union. However, there is no question
that the logic of disapproval on its own could apply in far too
many situations of discrimination such as the examples discussed
by the court in Brockie. Both a printer who refused to print
editorial content and a printer who refused to print a business
directory aimed at LGBTQ interests would likely have asserted
their refusal on the basis of their disapproval.
The conclusion reached by the majority and concurrence in
Marriage Commissioners was the correct one, and a great deal of
their analysis is extremely helpful in advancing the law about
belief-based exemptions in the context of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. The proposed exemptions, if enacted,
would not have been constitutional due to their deleterious
effects, the particular harms of official and ex ante policies
permitting discrimination, and the role of the marriage
commissioners as agents of the province. For all that, it should
be recognized that for some individuals, solemnizing a same-sex
marriage could go against their sincerely held religious beliefs,
and they may choose to leave their position as marriage
commissioner rather than be compelled to create the union. Being
forced out of work is a significant and coercive result. However,
when weighed against the proposed exemptions’ serious
individual and social harms, these exemptions would not be
constitutional, and the court was correct in finding that the right
to equality in this case should prevail.
III. CONCLUSION: CAN FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND EQUALITY BE
RECONCILED? GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND CONCLUSIONS
A serious and dedicated approach to equality, freedom of
210

Id.

2014.05.05 AVIV.DOCX

5/11/2014 12:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

668

religion, and dignity acknowledges that people hold diverse views
which will come into conflict from time to time. In addressing
belief-based exemption cases, a few themes emerge that may help
guide future cases. These can be derived from existing Canadian
case law and from a critical analysis of some of the decisions.
First, the issues at play are complex and cannot be resolved in
the abstract.211 Freedom of religion and equality do not lend
themselves to reconciliation in many of the belief-based
exemption cases, and resorting to higher-order principles will
generally not provide a solution, as these principles frequently
apply to both rights.
Religion is a subset of equality, as it is one of the prohibited
grounds of discrimination. Freedom of religion also embodies
elements of freedom of association and liberty. Equality likewise
incorporates these elements. Both equality and freedom of
religion may relate to a value system, which is sincerely believed
in and deeply cherished by many individuals. Indeed, the two are
not mutually exclusive. For many religious individuals, a deeply
held and cherished belief in the inherent dignity, equality, and
worth of all people comes from their religious faith. And
numerous religious individuals and groups have been involved in
various antidiscrimination causes, including efforts to recognize
same-sex marriage in Canada. Finally, the concept of dignity—
generally recognized as being at the heart of the right to
equality—also underlies the protection of religious freedom, as
pointed out by the dissent in Chamberlain and the court in
Brockie. Thus, for example, if one is forced to pray to a foreign
deity, touch an impure object, use one’s artistry or talents to tell a
false story, or have one’s children taught an ideology that runs
counter to one’s deeply held values—this may amount to a
violation of dignity.
In the result, where an individual or entity seeks an exemption
based on their religious beliefs from the duty to provide services
to the public without discrimination on the basis of sexual

See, e.g., Benjamin L. Berger, Key Theoretical Issues in the
Interaction of Law and Religion: A Guide for the Perplexed , 19 CONST. F.
211
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orientation, a theoretical reconciliation between equality and
freedom of religion will often not be possible. Instead, individual
exemptions should be examined on the basis of their concrete
facts in context and on a case-by-case basis. Courts should
consider evidence as to the specific individuals’ beliefs, the actual
harms that would result from infringing a person’s religious
freedom, as well as the actual harms from the discrimination. The
examination should include not only the impact on individuals,
but also the broader social, legal and historical discrimination and
context at issue, as considered by the Tribunal in Eadie and the
court in Marriage Commissioners. The section 1 Charter test
provides a helpful framework for such an analysis and balancing
exercise.
Given that reconciliation between the rights is not likely, the
second theme that emerges is that one party’s fundamental right
may be violated, and a coercive solution may be necessary. This
conclusion, while uncomfortable, would result regardless of
which way the court decided. And coercive solutions are
consistent with many other laws that force individuals to act in a
manner they might not otherwise have chosen, including the
human rights laws that prohibit discrimination.
Third, adjudicators would do well to reflect on their own
prejudices. Courts should avoid the kinds of hetero-normative
assertions made by the dissent in Chamberlain, and focus instead
on a respect for diversity on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity.
The fourth guiding principle, similarly, addresses a particular
preconception that may preclude adjudicators from engaging
seriously with the rights on both sides of the conflict. Some
people sincerely feel that their religion prohibits them from
participating in certain events or activities. Courts should not
summarily dismiss, as the concurrence did in Marriage
Commissioners,212 the difficulties faced by someone required to
choose between their work, and their conscience and dignity, if
forced to act against their beliefs. Nor should an adjudicative
body impose its own understanding of religion on the person
212
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seeking religious freedom. What the court can and should do is
examine the evidence concerning both the sincerity of the belief
and the possible harms that could occur if a person’s religious
freedom is infringed. Courts must take seriously the possibility
that individuals may be concerned about harming their
relationship with their Lord or about the “righteous judgment of
God.” Such sensitivity and consideration is not the end of the
process, but it is necessary to examining and balancing the real
issues at stake.
The fifth principle that emerges from the case law is that
official, sweeping, or ex ante exemptions permitting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the provision
of services should be avoided. Such exemptions may send a
message that discrimination is to be expected, tolerated, and
legitimized, as reasoned by the concurrence in Marriage
Commissioners, and could lead to the institutionalization and
perpetuation of the discrimination.
Finally, belief-based exemptions, if allowed at all, must be
extremely rare and exceptional. None of the cases discussed in
this Article presented a justified belief-based exemption.
However, it is possible that such situations may occur. For
example, as discussed, if a person is asked to participate in
creating a product with which they disagree, an exemption might
be justified if the requested product would be derogatory or
hateful towards the service provider and/or hateful towards a
group protected under the antidiscrimination laws.
New situations may also bring to light the possibility of other
exemptions. For instance, services that require the exceptionally
intimate and personal involvement of a service provider in a
relationship with which they disagree may generate a different
conclusion than services requiring a more tenuous connection.
For example, a sex therapist who refuses to work with a same-sex
couple likely has a stronger argument, on the basis of intimacy,
than an electrician who refuses to rewire that couple’s home.
Even in the case of the sex therapist, however, and assuming that
bona fide occupational requirements were not at issue, a casespecific, contextual analysis is required that would consider the
reason for the refusal, the question of minimal impairment, and
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the deleterious and salutary effects of granting the requested
exemption. Such an analysis may conclude in favour of the sex
therapist because of the exceptional intimacy required, or it may
reach the conclusion that the therapist should find a less intimate
occupation.
The danger of the slippery slope is significant in belief-based
exemption cases, and balancing exercises to assess these cases
give adjudicators wide discretion. Absent a strict exceptionality
standard, there could be too many discriminatory refusals. Thus,
for example, even if one were to take the standard from Brockie,
in which a service provider may be exempt if the material
conflicts with their core beliefs, and make it stricter by adding a
requirement that the service provider must have a direct and
personal involvement in the work, in its outcome, or with the
customer, the list of possible exemptions would still be long.
After all, many service providers are personally involved in their
work and/or with customers, and some individuals do hold beliefs
that would lead them to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity. Refusals that meet this description
could include (to use recent Canadian and American examples): a
florist asked to enhance the beauty of a wedding; bed and
breakfast owners renting out a room in their home; or a wedding
photographer whose job it is to create a lasting image of love and
romance.
It is not difficult to imagine any number of other situations
that could also meet this standard, including: an architect asked to
design a family home for a family they believe should not exist—
or a builder or interior designer with similar views; a lawyer,
banker, or investment adviser asked to protect the property of
children or a spouse in a family arrangement the service-provider
considers invalid; a wedding planner, dress maker, or barber who
objects to the wedding, or perhaps a hairdresser or manicurist
who objects to the romance; a teacher whose beliefs run counter
to parts or all of the curriculum; a police officer whose job may
involve risking their own safety to protect an event (a Pride
parade), ceremony (a same-sex marriage), or person (a politician
active in promoting LGBTQ rights) that the police officer does
not believe warrants such protection; a health provider or hospital
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worker asked to convey information or provide assistance to the
loved one of a patient—or asked to deliver a baby in a family
arrangement of which they disapprove.
It is difficult to accept the idea that doctors or police officers
might refuse to save or protect individuals in any circumstances.
It is also difficult to contemplate a society in which refusals to
provide service that single out customers based on their sexual
orientation could be commonly tolerated and institutionalized. It
is for this reason that exemptions, if any, should be extremely
rare and exceptional. After all, the human rights laws were
passed because of people’s refusal to countenance a society in
which discrimination would be tolerated. To countenance it now
is deeply concerning in the face of pervasive and often socially
accepted discrimination against people on the basis of their sexual
orientation or gender identity. Accepting exemptions in any but
the most exceptional of circumstances could lead to many acts of
refusal and exclusion, and could legitimize and perpetuate this
discrimination, undermining the very purpose of our human
rights laws. Such a result would be out of balance and would not
justify violating the dignity, equality, and fundamental rights of
people in Canada.

